How Vulnerable are Small Unmanned
Aerial Systems (sUAS) to Cyber Attack?
Abstract
Small unmanned aerial systems
(sUAS), often referred to as ‘drones,’ consist
of aeronautical hardware, CPU, RAM, onboard
storage, 802.11 Wi-Fi or other radio communication
links, sensors, camera(s), and a controller used by the
pilot-in-command. Some have suggested that a drone is
essentially a flying computer. As such, drones are potentially
susceptible to cyber attacks. To test this hypothesis on one
such drone, a Holy Stone HS100 (See Figure 1) was acquired
to test against various forms of cyber attack. We identified
cyber-related vulnerabilities and exploits for the drone, and
then performed attacks to identify the feasibility,
practicality, and significance of the attack, as
well as their effects on the drone’s ability to
maintain a safe and functional flight.

Methodology
To create accurate research, we aimed at
simulating these attacks through a set up that would
be likely from a real-world bad actor. We developed a
small, inexpensive, and portable attack platform consisting of
the credit card-sized Raspberry Pi Model 3 B+ running Linux,
which served as a network proxy, combined with (primarily) open
source vulnerability assessment and attack software. Additional
hardware included secondary external wireless adapters capable of
running in monitor and promiscuous modes (either at 2.4 or 5GHz
frequencies) See Figure 2. A small battery powered proxy allows a
malicious actor to attack cyber-physical systems covertly by physically
hiding the attack platform, as well as obfuscating attribution (e.g., MAC
and IP address). A vulnerability assessment was conducted to identify
vulnerabilities for the drone. The Holy Stone uses Wi-Fi for the First
Person Video (FPV) feed, and RF for the Command & Control link.
The drone also served as a Wi-Fi access point running DHCP.
The Holy Stone also comes with a dedicated physical
controller, and uses a smart phone for the
FPV video feed.
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Figure 1: HolyStone HS 100 Drone

Figure 2: Hardware attack architecture

Figure 3: Deauthentication attack on the HS 100

Attack Hardware Cost
• Used Laptop: $150
• Raspberry Pi 3 B+: $40
• External Wireless Adapter: $25

• Software: Free

Results
The Holy Stone drone was vulnerable
to several exploits and attacks:
1) Communication links between the controller and drone
did not require authentication. Multiple users could connect to
the drone simultaneously, and using a de-authentication attack,
allow a threat actor to take control of the drone.
2) Exposed unencrypted telnet and FTP services. (Note: The drone’s
FTP server could not be connected to.)
3) No authentication mechanism in place for login via telnet. This allows
multiple users to connect to the drone without authenticating.
4) Telnet access dropped the user into an unrestricted superuser account.
Using the “turnoff” and “reboot” commands dropped the FPV link from
the drone to the controller, requiring a physical reboot of the drone in
order to reconnect.
5) A de-authentication attack was performed on the FPV video link
between the controller and the drone, resulting in a loss of the FPV
video feed (See Figure 3).
6) No authentication was required to connect from the
smart phone (used for FPV) and the drone. This
link was unencrypted, which allowed us to
eavesdrop on the connection.

Conclusion &
Recommendations
The purpose of this research was to identify
vulnerabilities and exploits related to a single hobbyist
drone. We found that the drone provided remote access without
any mechanism for authentication, and the communication links
were not encrypted. When connecting over telnet or FTP, users
were dropped into a superuser account, which has unrestricted access
to commands, files, and directories. We identified onboard
destructive commands, including commands to delete files and
directories, kill processes, and turn the drone off. We performed
Wi-Fi de-authentication attacks resulting in disconnects between
the controller and drone. Uploading and downloading files via
FTP could theoretically be possible on the HS100 should the
FTP server be running. While this drone has multiple
vulnerabilities, these results are by no means
generalizable to other drones, and certainly
not military drones, which are
entirely different animals.

